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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the lower court erred in finding Why'rd in breach of its Agreement to 
provide bulk programming services to Cambria Homeowners Association when the 
services were far below industry standards and never met the low standards set forth in 
the Agreement? 
Standard of Review: Clearly erroneous on the facts, correctness on the application of the 
law, and broad discretion to the lower court with unjust enrichment claims. Desert 
Miriah, Inc. v.B&L Auto, Inc., 12 P.3d 580, 582 (Utah 2000); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 
P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
Preservation: All of the proceedings below revolved around issues related to breach of 
the Agreement. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action is based in a dispute over the proper interpretation of a contract that 
has carried on since 2009. Both parties have spent extensive time before judges and 
arbitrators to present their arguments. This action started with a series of preliminary 
injunctions and temporary restraining order requests before a district court judge. In those 
proceedings, the lower court noted that the findings of fact were not conclusive as the 
1 
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facts "could change at trial or arbitration" once both sides had time to gather all of their 
witnesses and go through the discovery process. [R.528, Appellant's Blue Brief Exhibit 
1]. After the rushed proceedings in the district court, the parties moved to arbitration to 
resolve the remainder of the issues. Once there, the Arbitrator first ruled on a Motion In 
Limine where Why'rd presented arguments claiming that its only duty was to provide 
services to Cambria Homeowners Association and not to its residents. This argument was 
soundly rejected by the Arbitrator. Next, the Arbitrator took live testimony in the matter 
and heard all arguments orally in over 20 hours of trial where both sides finally had the 
opportunity to present all of the facts relevant to the dispute. After this fact intensive trial, 
both sides submitted extensive briefs to the Arbitrator to solidify their arguments. After 
all of this, the Arbitrator issued a decision as to the proper interpretation of the contract 
and found Why'rd in breach of the contract. Why'rd now appeals the Arbitrator's 
findings. 
Statement of Facts 
Cambria Homeowners Association ("Cambria") contracted with Why'rd for basic 
internet and cable TV services. [R. 1619:24-1618:9, 1613:18-1612:5]. Cambria was not 
interested in requiring every tenant to purchase a premium package, so it contracted for 
basic services and for the ability of individual tenants to upgrade their packages. 
[Agreement Schedule 1 & 2; R. 901:17-21, 895:14-23]. Cambria tenants quickly began 
experiencing trouble with the internet and cable TV services. [R. 1610:11-1608:4, 
1269:14-1267:8]. Why'rd never successfully resolved these issues. [R. 1606:12-1603:9, 
1265:7-21]. Cambria tenants were not receiving the service speeds specified in the 
2 
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contract with Why'rd. [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact |9 (quoting a stipulated fact)]. 
Cambria tenants also never had reliable internet or cable TV. [R. 1610:11-1603:9]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Cambria Homeowners Association ("Cambria") contracted with Why'rd for basic 
internet and cable TV programming services. It is undisputed that the programming 
services were subpar and not very functional. The dispute below and the essence of the 
dispute before this Court revolves around who carries the risks under the contract when 
the services specified in the contract are provided in an extremely poor manner. Why'rd 
would have this Court believe that it wrote a contract requiring Cambria to pay monthly 
fees for broken programming services. Why'rd would also have this Court believe that 
the poor services were caused by tenants at Cambria and that Why'rd had no duty to help 
resolve any of the problems allegedly caused by the tenants. 
Cambria's responses to Why'rd's arguments are quite simple. First, Cambria 
contracted for basic programming services and not broken programming services. When 
Cambria contracted for these basic programming services, it reasonably expected to 
receive a working product. In other words, one who enters into a contract for cable TV 
could expect that they would be able to access and view cable TV when the TV is turned 
on. 
Second, a provision disclaiming the ability to provide a guaranteed level of 
throughput cannot be used to eviscerate the rest of the contract. The no guarantee 
provision found in the contract allows for reasonable drops in the level of throughput at 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reasonable intervals, but does not sanction the provision of broken services for the life of 
the contract. 
Third, Cambria is not in the business of regulating internet users, and it 
specifically contracted with Why'rd so that Why'rd would appropriately regulate the 
users to "preserve the integrity of the system." [Agreement Schedule 2]. Why'rd refused 
to add a comparatively inexpensive device to the system to regulate individual users so 
that one user would not be able to affect the levels of throughput for other users. 
Fourth, Cambria is not being unjustly enriched by Why'rd's infrastructure because 
it is not using it. To the contrary, Cambria is burdened by the remains of Why'rd's 
infrastructure that pollutes the landscape of the property. Cambria has no use of the 
pedestals, relay boxes, et cetera that Why'rd left behind. Moreover, Why'rd has been 
given full opportunity to remove its equipment and has taken what it desires. Exhibit #1 
attached hereto is a true and correct of email correspondence between Why'rd's counsel 
and Cambria's counsel showing that Why'rd was given full opportunity to remove its 
property and in fact did remove its property without further objection. Why'rd complains 
that to remove the remaining equipment it would have to tear up sidewalks and gutters to 
remove the inexpensive conduit pipe that houses the wires. This is plainly not true as the 
majority of the equipment is above ground, or was stored in the clubhouse, and the 
majority of the equipment has been removed. Even more, Why'rd continues to use some 
of the remaining underground conduit on-site for purposes of monitoring a fire alarm 
system for which they are compensated each month (the fire alarm system is governed by 
a separate contract not in dispute between the parties). It would not be just to require 
4 
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Cambria to reimburse Why'rd when Why'rd was the one that failed to perform under the 
contract. To require such would result in great harm to Cambria, and Why'rd would be 
transferring the risk of Why'rd's nonperformance to Cambria - a ridiculous proposition to 
maintain in these circumstances. 
Fifth, Why'rd's entire argument flies in the face of what any normal, reasonable 
being would agree to. Persons signing a contract for internet and cable TV services are 
not signing in expectation of receiving services that only function occasionally, nor are 
they signing with the intentions of becoming the technicians who monitor and control the 
system to make sure it is working and functioning properly. With internet and cable, any 
reasonable person would expect the service providers to do the behind-the-scenes work to 
make the programming functional when the TV or computer is turned on. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE ARBITRAL AWARD SHOULD BE UPHELD BECAUSE THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT HAVE SUFFICIENT EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT 
AND THE CONCLUSION OF WHY'RD'S BREACH OF THE 
AGREEMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE SAME FACTS. 
An appellate court does not act as a fact finder in an action. State v. James, 819 
P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991) ("an appellate court does not sit as a second fact finder"). It is 
commonly known that trials before lower courts, or arbitrators in appropriate situations, 
serve the purpose of finding the facts in actions brought before the judiciary. These 
findings of fact must be respected and upheld unless an appellant can satisfy a heavy 
burden of showing that the findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Woodward v. Fazzio, 
823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991). The mere existence of conflicting evidence does not 
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warrant reversal because the fact-finder also sits as a judge of the veracity and strength of 
the facts presented. James, 819 P.2d at 784. If the clearly erroneous burden is not 
satisfied, the findings of fact must be relied upon on appeal, even if individuals have 
differing opinions as to how the facts should have been stated. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 
732, 738 (Utah App. 1990). The conclusions of law reached below will also be upheld 
when the facts were correctly applied to the law. Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 
12 P.3d 580, 582 (Utah 2000). 
In this appeal, Why'rd is essentially seeking a second chance at having a judge 
find facts in its favor. Why'rd wants this Court to hold that Why'rd did not breach its 
service Agreement by providing extremely poor internet and television services to the 
residents who are a part of Cambria Homeowners Association ("Cambria"). In essence, 
all of Why'rd's arguments boil down to one of two positions, 1. that Cambria and 
Why'rd specifically contracted for extremely poor services, or 2. that Cambria's residents 
somehow caused Why'rd's services to be extremely poor. As was found at arbitration, 
neither position is well founded in any fact and was properly rejected. This Court should 
also recognize that Why'rd is seeking to claim these two positions and that neither one is 
a supportable claim. 
Why'rd has tried to make its appeal seem to be more than the two positions above 
by stating that there are seven issues presented to this Court for review. However, each 
issue raised by Why'rd is just a factor in determining the true issue here - whether 
Why'rd breached its agreement. Even the unjust enrichment claims are tied up in which 
6 
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party breached the agreement because the equitable factors of compensation in this case 
are directly tied to which party failed to uphold its end of the bargain. 
Again, Why'rd is attempting to have this Court find that it did not breach the 
agreement. Before examining Why'rd's claims on appeal, it is instructive to consider 
what Why'rd has not appealed. Even if all of Why'rd's contentions on appeal had merit 
(which they do not), a judge could still find from the facts not appealed that Why'rd still 
breached the agreement. Below is a non-exhaustive list of findings that Why'rd is not 
disputing: 
1. The decision on the Motion In Limine [Arbitral Award Part II & Findings of Fact 
14], which states in pertinent part: 
a. "Schedule 2 of the Agreement provides that system capacity within the 
project is 'lOmbps to each tenant.' As defined above, tenant is each 
individual unit at the property. Thus, the Agreement provides that each 
individual unit at the property shall have a coaxial, fiber optic or hybrid 
fiber optic, SMATV, MMDS, 5-900MHz or 18 GHZ multi-channel audio, 
video, data, internet, broadband services distribution system capacity of 10 
mbps." [Decision on Motion In Limine 18 (emphasis added)]. 
2. "The Agreement was drafted by Why'rd." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact 13]. 
3. "The Agreement provided that 'each tenant to have access to 3 mbps of download 
throughput, 256 kbps of upload throughput, upon completion of the project.'" 
[Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact 15]. • 
4. "The project was completed." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact 16]. 
7 
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5. "The parties have stipulated that 'No end user is currently receiving, or has access 
to, 3 mbps at all times.'" [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact ^[9]. 
6. "Bandwidth speeds in the neighbourhood [sic] of 0.27 mbps were measured by at 
least one tenant. Other witnesses testified that this was roughly the typical speeds 
that they would expect." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact 110]. 
7. "Other tenants found the internet service to be unusable for normal residential 
internet use. Tenants testified that the internet was frequently out and that basic 
functions such as email and blogging were not functional. Long periods of 
disruption were experienced by tenants." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact f 11]. 
8. "The number one complaint to the Cambria homeowners association was 
unreliable internet." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact 112]. 
9. "Television service provided by Why'rd was frequently poor and included blank 
channels, fuzzy channels, missing channels, changing channel numbers and the 
like. Tenants had no ability to upgrade television service. For example, there was 
no evidence that any tenant was able to upgrade to HD. Certain tenants 
supplemented their television service by other means, such as installation of a 
satellite dish." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact f 16]. 
10. "Cambria tenants logged numerous complaints about poor television service." 
[Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact f 17]. 
11. "The Agreement provided that 'Broadband, internet, and data services will be re-
evaluated every two years to ensure that services being offered by American 
Home Systems (Why'rd) are comparable in price and quality to services being 
8 
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offered to the majority of the general public.'" [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact 
122]. 
12. "Why'rd never updated or changed the services being offered to Cambria." 
[Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact f23]. 
13. "Why'rd failed to keep the system competitive within industry standards." 
[Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact f 24]. 
14. "Cambria is not currently using the components of the Why'rd system. Television 
and internet services are being provided to Cambria tenants through alternative 
means." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact |27]. 
15. "The throughput levels actually provided by Why'rd were substantially below this 
3 mbps threshold. The internet service actually provided was at levels which 
constituted a material breach of the Agreement." [Arbitral Award, Conclusions f2] 
(Why'rd appeals the finding in Conclusion 13(b) but does not address | 2 in its 
brief). 
It is readily apparent from this short list, which is not contested on appeal, that 
Why'rd provided extremely poor programming services and that the specifications set 
forth in the "plain language" of the contract were never met. In its brief, Why'rd attempts 
to paint a picture that it tried to provide good services to Cambria, but that Cambria 
rejected the "Toyota Land Cruiser" Why'rd was offering to take a "Chevy Geo" instead, 
even though Why'rd told Cambria the "Chevy Geo" version only provided the basics. 
[Appellant's Blue Brief p.l 1]. Why'rd then states that Cambria became dissatisfied when 
the "Chevy Geo" would not get through the snow. However, as is clear from the 
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uncontested facts above, Cambria did not become dissatisfied with the "Chevy Geo" 
version provided by Why'rd when the snow started falling. It became dissatisfied with 
the "Chevy Geo" when it would not operate even in sunny, clear conditions for more than 
an hour or two and when it would not even start. In other words, Cambria quickly learned 
that Why'rd had sold it a lemon1, and nothing Why'rd has argued in its brief to this court 
changes that fact. 
A. The Agreement provides that Why'rd will provide functional services and in 
no way excuses Why'rd from providing programming services that actually 
work. 
Cambria agrees that "[t]he primary purpose of contract interpretation is to 
'ascertain the intentions of the parties' at the time of contracting." Equine Assisted 
Growth and Learning Ass yn v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 266 P.3d 733, f 13 (Utah 2011). In 
contract disputes, the best source to look to for the intentions of the parties is in the plain 
language of the contract itself. Id. As the intent of this contract was clearly for functional 
internet and cable TV services provided to Cambria and serviced by Why'rd, Why'rd is 
in breach of the Agreement. Thus, this Court should uphold the findings below as the 
findings are in harmony with the plain language and clear intent of the Agreement. 
1. The contract provides for service levels of at least 3mbps and the no guarantee 
of throughput levels clause does not operate to void the contractually agreed upon 
speeds. 
The Agreement is titled "Bulk Programming Services Agreement." Cambria, as an 
HOA, was interested in providing basic internet and cable options to its residents. 
1
 The term "lemon" is often used in automobile sales when a vehicle is sold that appears 
fine but quickly breaks down after purchase. Utah's "lemon" laws are codified in Title 
13, Chapter 20 of the Utah Code. 
10 
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[R. 905:22-904:9]. While it specifically opted to reduce the residents' monthly fees by 
going with a basic programming package, [R. 905:22-903:18], Cambria's intent was 
clearly to provide basic programming services. As is expected by any user of cable or 
internet, so long as the power is on, they should have access to the programming 
provided by the internet and cable provider. Cambria's intent was no different and the 
"Bulk Programming Services Agreement" reflected Cambria's intent to pay $42.20 per 
month per tenant for the basic programming options offered by Why'rd. [Agreement 
Schedule 3]. 
Why'rd contends that the "plain language" of the Agreement provides otherwise 
and that the contract evinces intent to contract for extremely poor services - services that 
no rational being would normally agree to. Why'rd points to a provision which states that 
"[g]uarantee of minimum throughput levels are not available due to the constant 
fluctuation of utilization throughout the system." Why'rd attempts to use this provision to 
say that, even though the "plain language" of the contract also says that "Bulk 
Programming will include the ability for each tenant to have access to 3mbps of 
download throughput, 256kbps of upload throughput," no certain speed or quality level 
was ever agreed upon. 
For most, a reading of the "plain language" of the contract would show the intent 
that end users should, normally, have access to 3mpbs of download throughput 
[Agreement Schedule 2 ("each tenant [will] have access to 3mbps of download 
throughput")], but that occasional variations or dips in speed should be expected when 
traffic is extremely high, just like drivers would expect slower commute times during 
11 
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rush hour. The Arbitrator held this to be the case, [Arbitral Award, Conclusions | 1 ] , and 
this Court should as well. Why'rd, however, argues that the language disclaiming a 
guaranteed speed means that a general speed of 0.27mbps (roughly 10% of the 3mbps 
stated in the contract) is somehow acceptable, [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact [^10] 
even though the "plain language" of the contract provides for 3mbps as the general speed 
contracted for by both parties. 
On appeal, Why'rd's specific argument is that the Arbitrator did not have enough 
evidence to make a conclusion, as a matter of law, that the no guarantee provision still 
requires Why'rd to provide 90% of the service speeds stated in the contract. [Appellant's 
Blue Brief § 1(a)]. Why'rd's argument, though, does not change anything here because of 
the second conclusion reached by the Arbitrator, that "[t]he throughput levels actually 
provided by Why'rd were substantially below this 3 mbps threshold. The internet service 
actually provided was at levels which constituted a material breach of the Agreement." 
[Arbitral Award, Conclusions f2 (emphasis added)]. 
Assume, for the sake of argument, that Why'rd could provide speeds that were 
consistently 50%, 40%, or even 30% of the speeds stated in the contract and stay within 
an acceptable range of the no guarantee provision. If the 90% stated by the Arbitrator was 
somehow wrong, Why'rd would still be in breach of the Agreement because its services 
were of such poor quality that they fell entirely beyond the reach of even the no 
guarantee provision. Providing only 10% of the contractually-stated speeds is a material 
breach of the Agreement, and that was the true essence of the finding below. 
12 
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Thus, even if the Arbitrator was wrong in writing down 90% as the target speed to 
provide, it was not wrong in finding Why'rd in breach of the Agreement by providing 
only 10% of the speeds agreed to in the contract. Accordingly, Why'rd's arguments on 
the lack of evidence for the 90% conclusion have no merit because Why'rd did not 
contest the Arbitrator's conclusion that "[t]he throughput levels actually provided by 
Why'rd were substantially below this 3 mbps threshold. The internet service actually 
provided was at levels which constituted a material breach of the Agreement." [Arbitral 
Award, Conclusions | 2 (emphasis added)]. Additionally, the Arbitrator did have evidence 
to reach the 90% conclusion, and so this Court should uphold that conclusion. 
Why'rd also stipulated in its Motion in Limine, near the outset of arbitration, that 
"No end user is currently receiving, or has access to, 3 mbps at all times." [Arbitral 
Award, Findings of Fact ]f9]. Why'rd actually never presented evidence showing that any 
tenant at any time enjoyed speeds of 3mbps, [see Appellant's Blue Brief "Statement of 
Facts" and Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact |9 ] , and the evidence presented all supported 
the fact that 0.27mbps "was roughly the typical speeds that [the residents] would expect." 
[Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact ^[10]. Why'rd claims though that it knew its internet 
was bare-bones and that it specifically contracted for the disclaimer provision because it 
was afraid customers would be dissatisfied with the slow speeds. [Appellant's Blue Brief 
p.6]. Cambria recognizes it was purchasing a base level internet, however that base level 
was 3mbps as stated in the contract; a speed that Why'rd outright, and admittedly, failed 
to provide [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact | 9 ("The parties have stipulated that 'No 
end user is currently receiving, or has access to, 3 mbps at all times'")]. Cambria 
n 
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recognized the possibility that some residents might be dissatisfied with 3mbps and 
accordingly contracted with Why'rd for the ability of the residents to upgrade the \ 
services if desired. [Agreement Schedule 1 & 2 "Additional Services"; R. 901:17-21, 
895:14-23]. 
Consider the upgrade provisions for a moment. If a tenant wanted to pay $10 extra 
per month for a 5mbps internet service, Why'rd would still likely disclaim any guarantee 
of certain speeds due to fluctuations in internet use. Thus, under Why'rd's arguments, a { 
person would be contracting to pay extra money for a service that they may never 
receive. It is obvious that an internet provider would be shortsighted to guarantee a 
consistent internet speed at all times, but they would also be foolish to sell 3mbps 
services and only provide 0.27mbps services at all times. Reading the no guarantee 
provision as Why'rd would have this Court do would allow internet providers to contract 
with customers for 3, 5, 10, 20, or 40 mbps internet services and never actually have to 
provide, even once, what was advertised or agreed upon. Such a reading of the contract 
would sanction the use of deception in the provision of internet services. Accordingly, 
Why'rd's reading of the contractual disclaimer must be rejected since the contract 
specifically states what speeds are to be provided. 
While Cambria was contracting for basic programming services, it was not 
contracting for speeds that functioned only at about 10% of the stated speeds in the 
contract. Cambria was not contracting for broken services, rather, it was contracting for 
basic services. Why'rd is attempting to use the disclaimer provision as a means to 
eviscerate the other language in the contract. The Arbitrator below did not allow Why'rd 
14 
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to do so, because the "plain language" of a contract must be interpreted in harmony with 
the other "plain language" provisions in the contract. WebBank v. American General 
Annuity Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1144 (Utah 2002) ("[w]e look to the writing itself 
to ascertain the parties1 intentions, and we consider each contract provision ... in relation 
to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none" (emphasis 
added)). As Why'rd's proposed interpretation is not in harmony with the remainder of the 
contract, it cannot be relied upon or accepted by this Court. The findings by the 
Arbitrator were correct as they provided a harmonious interpretation of the contract, see 
id., and they should be upheld by this Court. 
2. Why'rd was required by the Agreement to maintain functional internet service 
for 20% of 120 consecutive days, or for 24 consecutive days. 
Why'rd argues to this Court that the contract agreed upon by both parties only 
required Why'rd to provide internet that operated one out of every five days. [Appellant's 
Blue Brief p.21]. Why would anyone agree to buy a product that only works one out of 
every five days? Why'rd does not say, but still attempts to argue straight-faced to this 
Court that its only obligation was to have internet that worked 20% of the time despite its 
obligation to have "services revaluated every two year to ensure that services being 
offered by American Home Systems are comparable in price and quality to services bing 
offered to the majority of the general public." [Agreement §3.7, Arbitral Award |22]. 
Why'rd states that the internet only has to function for "the required 24 random days of a 
120 consecutive day period." [Appellant's Blue Brief p.21]. Note also, that twenty 
percent of 120 consecutive days is not 24 random days of functional service, as Why'rd 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
is arguing. Twenty percent of 120 consecutive days is 24 consecutive days of functional 
service. i 
In either case, whether the contract allowed for functional service for an abysmal 
24 random days or 24 consecutive days, Why'rd did not provide functional service for 
any day in the course of the contract. Why'rd's own technicians and experts do not 
contest the fact that typical speeds of internet to the tenants of Cambria was 0.27mbps, 
which is only 10% of what was required of the contract. Second, by applying WebBank 
and giving full effect to all provisions of the contract, Why'rd had the obligation under 
Section 3.7 to "re-evaluate every two years to ensure that services being offered by 
American Home Systems [Why'rd] are comparable in price and quality to services being 
offered to the majority of the general public." If the 20% service level was somehow 
acceptable in 2007, it was clearly not acceptable in 2010, 2011, or 2012 where internet 
and cable TV have become a daily staple of American life. Comparable quality service 
would need to function nearly all of the time. Thus, even if the Agreement originally 
contemplated only 24 random days of service, the Agreement clearly stated that such 
services would improve right along with the services offered to the remainder of the 
general public. 
Why'rd does not contest the finding below that "Why'rd never updated or changed 
the services being offered to Cambria. Why'rd failed to keep the system competitive 
within industry standards." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact ft23"24!- Because of 
Why'rd's breach of Section 3.7, the 20% service level is immaterial to the issue of breach 
of the entire Agreement now as Why'rd was required by Section 3.7 of the Agreement to 
16 
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keep the quality of the services comparable to those offered to the general public, and 
Why'rd did not do this. 
Third, continuing to apply WebBank, Section 3.2.2 of the Agreement provides that 
Why'rd must use "commercially reasonable efforts to minimize disruption of the 
Systems' delivery of Bulk Programming to Subscribers" when testing or maintaining the 
system. Commercially reasonable efforts would not produce 80% downtime, as Why'rd 
is arguing it is entitled to with the 20% service level provision. Again, when read as a 
whole, the Agreement contemplates reliable internet service, which Why'rd failed to 
provide. 
The Arbitrator did make findings on the 20% service level point though, and 
Why'rd did not contest those findings on appeal. The Arbitrator found that: "Other 
tenants found the internet service to be unusable for normal residential internet use. 
Tenants testified that the internet was frequently out and that basic functions such as 
email and blogging were not functional. Long periods of disruption were experienced by 
tenants." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact |11 (emphasis added)]. "The number one 
complaint to the Cambria homeowners association was unreliable internet." [Arbitral 
Award, Findings of Fact f 12]. 
Thus, the Arbitrator had specific grounds to find Why'rd in breach of the 
Agreement. Again, Why'rd provided a lemon to Cambria, and its arguments to this Court 
serve as further proof of that fact as evidenced by Why'rd's attempts to creatively 
construe the contract to be for the sale of broken services, or for the sale of a lemon. 
17 
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3. The duty in the Agreement to monitor, control, and keep the system in good 
working order meant that Why'rd agreed to take reasonable measures to control 
system abusers. 
Again, Why'rd makes the attempt to say that the Agreement allows Why'rd to 
provide poor service to Cambria, and that Cambria is obligated to pay for the poor 
service. The Agreement specifically provides that Why'rd: "will purchase, install, repair, 
maintain and operate the System at the Property, including without limitation... 
distribution of Bulk Programming.... [Why'rd] agrees to keep the System and all related 
equipment in good working order and repair, and will be responsible to ensure that 
scrambling/descrambling equipment, firewalls and encryption technology is utilized 
within its System to prevent piracy of any Bulk Programming, or unauthorized usage of 
data circuits." [Agreement §3.5 (emphasis added)]. Additionally, Why'rd agreed that it 
would monitor and control indications of high levels of volume in order to "preserve the 
integrity of the system for all of its users." [Agreement Schedule 2 (emphasis added)]. 
Why'rd repeated all of this again in §5.2 of the Agreement, where it stated: "[Why'rd] 
agrees to keep the System and all related equipment in good working order and repair, 
and will be responsible to ensure that ... [other equipment and] technology is utilized 
within the System to prevent piracy of any Bulk Programming." 
In spite of these clear commands to ensure the continued functionality of the 
services provided to Cambria, Why'rd attempts to argue that its duties are limited to a 
narrow definition of the "System" it provided to Cambria. Put another way, Why'rd 
argues that while Cambria pays Why'rd for everything related to having internet and 
television programming show up on a tenant's computer or TV screen, Why'rd only 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contracted to maintain limited portions of that distribution system. Why'rd's position 
would be similar to a burglar alarm company providing alarm services and charging a 
monthly fee, and then telling its clients "too bad" when the alarm does not work because 
the physical equipment itself is still functional. Most residents do not contract with a 
burglar alarm company for services and yet agree to fix their own alarm when it breaks. 
Similarly, most contracting parties, including Cambria, do not contract to fix their own 
internet and TV problems that arise. HOA's are not in the business of servicing Bulk 
Programming Distribution Systems, and they would not contract to service a distribution 
system installed by another. 
In support of its contention, Why'rd turns to the definition of "System" specified 
in the Agreement. The definition states that "System" means: "a coaxial, fiber optic or 
hybrid fiber optic, SMATV, MMDS, 5-900MHz or 18 GHZ multi-channel audio, video, 
data, internet, broadband services distribution system owned and managed by [Why'rd] 
which serves the property." [Agreement §1]. Why'rd then states that the Agreement 
obligated Why'rd to keep "...the distribution mechanisms, in good working order, not to 
keep in good working order the ability of individual tenants to access desired levels of 
bandwidth." [Appellant's Blue Brief p.23]. This logic is seriously flawed. 
If the "broadband services distribution system" (part of the definition of "System" 
in Section 1 of the Agreement) is functioning correctly, then all users should have access 
to the levels of bandwidth that were contracted for by Cambria. Cambria contracted for 
3mbps. [Agreement Schedule 2]. Why'rd even stipulated that: "No end user is currently 
receiving, or has access to, 3 mbps at all times." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact %9 
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(emphasis added)]. Obviously, Why'rd was not contracting to provide computers for all 
of the tenants. However, it clearly contracted to provide the infrastructure necessary to 
give tenants with computers access to an average bandwidth of 3mbps. The definition of 
"System" clearly states this when it uses the term "broadband services distribution 
system." [Agreement §1]. Furthermore, the duties Why'rd took upon itself are not limited 
to maintaining a functional "System" alone. Often, the duties placed on Why'rd in the 
Agreement do not even use the term "System." Examples include: 
1. "[Why'rd] agrees to keep the System and all related equipment in good working 
order and repair." [Agreement §3.5 (emphasis added)]. 
2. "[Why'rd] will be responsible to ensure that scrambling/descrambling equipment, 
firewalls and encryption technology [here Why'rd names three non-"System" 
pieces] is utilized within its System to prevent piracy of any Bulk Programming, 
or unauthorized usage of data circuits [Why'rd also agreed to prevent 
unauthorized usage]." [Agreement §3.5 (commentary added)]. 
3. Why'rd also states "that high level of volume that indicates server related activity 
will be monitored and controlled to preserve the integrity of the system for all of 
its users." [Agreement Schedule 2]. Here, Why'rd agrees (in a section outlining 
the services it will provide) to monitor and control high levels of volume. This is 
a duty specifically related to use of the system by the tenants and not to some 
limited piece of hardware installed by Why'rd. 
Thus, even if the "System" would not normally include a QOS device (as Why'rd 
argues), Why'rd's duty is not limited to the hardware present in the "System" alone. 
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Why'rd specifically took on more duties than maintaining hardware in the "System" and 
should have acted to ensure that the "high volume" it complains of was appropriately 
controlled, as it clearly agreed to do. 
The Arbitrator, in reading the Agreement as a whole, correctly concluded that 
Why'rd breached the Agreement by failing to monitor and control high levels of volume. 
See WebBank, 54 P.3d at 1144. The QOS device mentioned in the Arbitral Award was 
Why'rd's duty, and under the Agreement Why'rd has no grounds to argue that Cambria 
must pay for or install such a device on its own. These findings are correct and should be 
upheld by this Court. 
B. Why'rd's problems are its own and are not caused by Cambria or its tenants. 
After Why'rd tries to argue to this Court that the Bulk Programming Services 
Agreement contemplated and allowed for Why'rd to provide extremely poor and 
unreliable programming services, it next tries to shift the duties that were not performed 
to Cambria to argue that Cambria is actually the cause of all the problems. While 
evaluating Why'rd's arguments in this section, it is wise to keep in mind that HOA's do 
not contract to regulate and maintain specialized infrastructure in the community. The 
HOA contracts with a third party who specializes in such matters. Clearly, HOA's do not 
fix the roads in the community, they do not shovel the sidewalks, they do not maintain 
the plumbing or sewer pipes, and they certainly do not service the programming 
distribution systems in the community. Yet, Why'rd would have this Court believe that 
Cambria HOA is somehow different and that it took upon itself the duty to service the 
programming distribution systems in the community. Nothing could be farther from the 
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truth, however, and as the Agreement clearly shows, Why'rd had the duty to service the 
programming distribution systems. 
1. Cambria never agreed to monitor its own tenants9 internet uses, and the 
Agreement only discusses inappropriate "servers" and not mere "uses" alone. 
Why'rd attacks Cambria by pointing to a handful of events where Cambria's 
tenants used the internet in ways that did not follow strict "residential" uses of the 
internet. Why'rd bases its arguments in the following provision from Schedule 2 of the 
Agreement: "This system is not designed for the support of high volume or commercial 
grade servers. The system is designed as a 'residential system,' meaning that high level of 
volume that indicates server related activity will be monitored and controlled to preserve 
the integrity of the system for all of its users." (emphasis added). In its arguments, rather 
than leaving out a word as it did before, Why'rd cleverly substitutes another word to 
create a very different meaning in the Agreement. Why'rd's argument is based on 
swapping the word "use" with the word "servers." As stated in its blue brief, "Why'rd 
challenges the Arbitrator's failure to find that Cambria residents engaged in 'high 
volume' and 'commercial' use of the internet system in violation of Schedule 2 of the 
Agreement." [Appellant's Blue Brief p.25 (emphasis added)]. Why'rd makes this claim 
even though the Agreement does not discuss use. 
In the internet world, "use" and "servers" are very different. Consider an average 
internet user at home. The user opens Internet Explorer to browse the internet. From there 
the user may go to Netflix to watch a show. As the show is transmitted to the user, the 
user may have engaged in a "high volume use" of the internet as the show likely takes up 
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precious bandwidth. However, the user has not in anyway placed a server on the system. 
Netflix has a server that can send out thousands to millions of requests at a time. Internet 
users would connect to Netflix's services to view the shows, but the user would not be 
connecting a server of his own to the residential system back at his house. 
Ironically, residential systems are very high use because residents, at home, 
engage in internet activities that consume large amounts of bandwidth, such as streaming 
video and online gaming. Usually, at work, individuals' internet activities are far more 
reduced and focus on transmitting smaller amounts of data back and forth, such as 
through e-mail. Thus, a "residential system" would be required to contemplate "high 
use," even if it did not contemplate servicing "high volume servers," such as those 
Netflix employs to stream movies to thousands of residential systems. 
Why'rd understands very well that individuals, at home, can attempt to attach 
"high volume servers" or "commercial grade servers" to the "residential system." The 
Agreement sets forth that the "residential system" is mainly designed to receive data and 
is not supposed to be a means to attach certain servers to send out large amounts of data. 
In spite of the Agreement's clear focus on "servers" being attached to the system, Why'rd 
states that "[t]he high volume and commercial use led to slow internet speeds and poor 
performance." [Appellant's Blue Brief, p.26 (emphasis added)]. Again, "residential 
systems" have to envision "high volume use" because of the nature of streaming video 
and online gaming. Schedule 2 of the Agreement is only concerned with servers though, 
and it is all that this Court should concern itself with as well, and Why'rd offered no 
evidence of servers being attached to the system. Indeed, the arbitrator appropriately 
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found, "There was no evidence of commercial grade servers being used on the system." 
[Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact [^14]. Thus, the arguments surrounding Montane 
Hamilton's alleged commercial use of the internet, or the alleged hosting of a 
pornographic website by a Cambria resident, noted in Appellant's Blue Brief, pp.25-26, 
either did not rise to a level of prohibited conducted under the Agreement as determined 
by the arbitrator or were not proven to have occurred at all. 
Even if Schedule 2 of the Agreement somehow contemplates certain uses not 
being allowed on the "residential system," the duty to monitor and control such use falls 
to Why'rd. Schedule 2 clearly sets forth services to be provided by Why'rd. Schedule 2 
has three paragraphs. The paragraphs are labeled "Service," "Additional Services," and 
"Service Level Agreement." The paragraph labeled "Service" states that Why'rd is 
providing "Bulk Programming" and that such programming will include a number of 
items which are then listed. The paragraph ends by discussing the "system" that Why'rd 
is providing to Cambria's tenants, and, in setting forth the specifics of the "system," then 
states that "activity will be monitored and controlled..." The entire "Service" paragraph 
discusses what Why'rd agreed to provide to Cambria. Cambria was not contracting to 
provide a "Service" to itself. Cambria was contracting, among other things, for Why'rd to 
provide a "Service," and the monitoring and control of the activity on the system was part 
of that "Service," as evidenced by its inclusion in the "Service" paragraph. [Agreement 
Schedule 2]. For these reasons, and others, the Arbitrator correctly found "the Agreement 
requires that Why'rd...keep the System in good working order and repair." [Arbitral 
Award, Findings of Fact ^ f 18]. 
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Why'rd, though, argues that "[i]t was clear error to not find that Cambria residents 
engaged in 'high volume' and 'commercial' use of the internet provided by Why'rd, 
where they plainly did so. Because Cambria residents violated the provisions of the 
Agreement, Why'rd should have been excused from its obligations under the 
Agreement." [Appellant's Blue Brief, p. 27]. This argument seriously misstates the 
import of Schedule 2 in the Agreement. Consider what the Agreement does not say. The 
Agreement does not say that "Cambria agrees that none of its residents will ever abuse 
their privileges under the 'residential system'." Rather, the Agreement says that because 
Why'rd only contemplates providing a "residential system," that Why'rd then maintains 
the right to monitor and control users who operate outside the "residential system" 
specifications, whatever those may be. By signing the Agreement, Cambria agreed to let 
Why'rd use reasonable means to control users who have attached servers or otherwise 
violated the terms specified for the "residential system." 
Due to the arrangement provided for in the Agreement where Why'rd could use 
reasonable means to control users, the Arbitrator never specifically ruled on Why'rd's 
claims that Cambria tenants engaged in "high volume" and "commercial" use of the 
system because such a finding was immaterial to anything in the action. In other words, 
even if there was "high volume" and "commercial" use of the system, it would not be a 
breach because Cambria never agreed to prohibit its residents from such use. As found by 
the Arbitrator, "There was no evidence of commercial grade servers being used on the 
system. There was one example of an internet "hogger," namely Shane Campbell. 
However, the fact that Mr. Campbell could "hog" the bandwidth is an indication that the 
9^ 
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system was not in good working order and repair and was not being adequately 
monitored." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact ^14 (emphasis added)]. Every bit of 
evidence that Why'rd offered to this Court to support the fact that residents were using 
the system inappropriately is just additional evidence, as the Arbitrator also found, that 
Why'rd breached its end of the Agreement to monitor and control the system as it agreed 
to do. Why'rd clearly had the duty to monitor and control the system and failed to do so. 
2. Cambria's insistence that Why'rd provide quality service to all of its residents 
did not interfere in anyway with Why'rd's ability to perform its duties under the 
Agreement. 
Why'rd next defends its extremely poor services by claiming that Cambria refused 
to allow Why'rd to fulfill its obligations under the Agreement. First, Why'rd claims that 
it wanted to completely shut out any users who may have hosted a website at one time or 
downloaded all of the seasons of Stargate. This is much like a "zero tolerance" policy 
adopted by schools, and would deny tenants access to the internet for doing something 
they never knew was in violation of the Agreement, such as downloading a bunch of 
shows to watch. Cambria, obviously, said "no" to such an approach because the 
Agreement was to provide service to all tenants. If there were issues with individual 
users, Cambria gave Why'rd the right to "control" certain "server related activity" 
performed by its tenants, but "control" is very different from cutting off all access. 
"Control" would mean to limit or otherwise regulate certain internet functions, but would 
not extend to denying access altogether. Thus, Cambria did not breach the Agreement by 
requiring Why'rd to "control" the users by limiting what could go back and forth along 
the wires instead of completely denying access to the system. 
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Second, Why'rd tells this Court that it was generous enough to offer to double the 
bandwidth to Cambria's residents. Of course, this would mean an extra $2/month for 
each resident. Why'rd infers that Cambria, in refusing this offer, was interfering with 
Why'rd's ability to provide quality internet. Why'rd seems to forget, though, that it 
contracted to provide 3mbps, and, as found below and not contested here, the residents 
could only expect approximately 1/10 of that speed at any given time. [Arbitral Award, 
Findings of Fact |10]. Thus, in offering to "double the bandwidth" available to each 
tenant for an additional $2/month, Why'rd was offering to provide 2/10 of what it had 
contracted to provide. What a deal. 
Parties to a contract cannot demand more money to perform the obligations that 
they originally contracted to perform as their obligations are already set by the original 
agreement. As the $2/month extra demanded by Why'rd to provide quality internet 
service was clearly an attempt to make more money to meet the obligations under the 
original contract, Cambria had no duty or reason whatsoever to go along with such 
demands. Consider the bigger perspective. An extra $2/month for 303 residents over the 
remaining life of the Agreement (77 months) is an additional $46,662 not contemplated 
in the original Agreement. Cambria did not interfere with Why'rd's performance by 
refusing to pay this extra money. 
Finally, Why'rd claims that Cambria was required to purchase the QOS device 
that would "control" users in appropriate ways. The QOS device was not expensive in 
comparison to all that Why'rd already invested in the system, [R. 1592:5-18], and it 
would have provided a simple solution to alleviate all of Why'rd's complaints about the 
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Cambria tenants use of the system. Why'rd refused to invest any more money into the 
system however, (possibly because it recognized that appropriately "controlling" the 
users would still not bring the internet speeds up to 3mbps), and demanded that Cambria 
pay for such a device. Cambria had not been obligated under the Agreement to provide 
any wires or hardware before, and there was no reason to require it now. 
The Agreement clearly states that Why'rd "will purchase, install, repair, maintain 
and operate the System at the Property." [Agreement §3.5 (emphasis added)]. By 
definition, the "System" includes an "audio, video, data, internet, broadband services 
distribution system owned and managed by [Why'rd]." [Agreement §1 (emphasis 
added)]. This Agreement clearly dictates that Why'rd is the owner of the equipment, and 
there is no reason it would be any different for a QOS device. Cambria did not hinder 
Why'rd from performing its duties in anyway. The Arbitrator correctly so held and this 
Court should as well. 
While Why'rd relies on Haymore v. Levinson, 328 P.2d 307 (Utah 1958) to justify 
its claims that Cambria interfered with Why'rd's obligations under the Agreement, this 
case only serves to go against some of Why'rd's claims. In applying this case, Why'rd 
confuses which party represents itself in this case. Why'rd assumes that it is the same as 
the innocent contractor who refused to perform work it was not contractually obligated to 
do. Id. at 309. However, Why'rd is actually the same as the homeowners who demanded 
more work before they paid the contractor. Id. Here, Why'rd had clear contractual duties. 
It did not fulfill these duties. [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact ffi[9-ll, 14]. When 
Cambria raised the issue, Why'rd demanded that Cambria pay $2/month extra, purchase a 
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QOS device, or cut off access to its tenants, all things outside the scope of the 
Agreement. Basically, Why'rd was the same as the homeowners who demanded that the 
non-breaching party provide more than the Agreement called for, and the Utah Supreme 
Court correctly recognized that the non-breaching party was not at fault for not conceding 
to the breaching party's demands that were not based in the original agreement. 
Haymore, 328 P.2d at 310. 
As correctly found below, Cambria did not breach the Agreement and did not 
interfere with Why'rd's performance under the Agreement. Cambria had no obligation to 
concede to Why'rd's demands that were not based in the Agreement. Accordingly, this 
Court should uphold the findings below that Why'rd breached the Agreement. 
3. An agreement to provide cable TV services is breached when the channels 
offered are not provided or when the signal is too fuzzy or incomplete to provide 
any meaningful viewing. 
At this point, it is relevant to point out that even without a breach of the cable TV 
programming Agreement, Why'rd would still be in breach of the Agreement as a whole 
by failing in its duty to properly provide internet access for residents. As determined 
below and not challenged here, "[t]he Agreement provided that Why'rd would provide 
the agreed services to Cambria for $42.20/month per Tenant. The contract in no way 
indicated what portion of that amount was allocated for internet and what portion was 
allocated for television." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact |15]. In other words, the 
contract never specified what service was more or less important, and not providing one 
service is a breach of the entire Agreement. Nevertheless, Why'rd's claims pertaining to 
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the cable TV will still be addressed to complete the picture of the poor service provided 
by Why'rd to Cambria and its residents. 
Why'rd tries to use its one slightly favorable fact from below to argue that the 
Arbitrator made conflicting decisions. Why'rd argues that because there was not enough 
evidence presented to show that Why'rd completely breached its customer service duty to 
resolve customer issues, then it must mean that the low level of cable TV service it 
provided was somehow not a complete breach of the Agreement. [Appellant's Blue Brief, 
p.34]. However, if a person purchases an appliance and the appliance breaks down on a 
daily basis, whether or not the company selling the appliance sends a serviceman out 
everyday to fix the appliance is immaterial to determining if the appliance met the terms 
of the sale agreement. At some point, individuals cannot be obligated to call the 
repairman yet again before they can determine that the product they purchased was faulty 
and violated the terms of the original agreement. It is no different here. While Why'rd did 
respond just enough for the Arbitrator to determine that it did not breach its duty to 
address customer concerns, the Arbitrator still held that the cable TV service was of too 
low quality to even satisfy the basic terms of the Agreement. [Arbitral Award, Findings 
of Fact UK16-17; Conclusions t f 3(e), 6]. 
At some point, low performing cable TV is no longer cable TV. Why'rd contends 
"[a]ll that the Agreement requires is that Why'rd provide cable television - whether of 
poor quality or not, Why'rd provided to Cambria the channels set forth in Schedule 1 of 
the Agreement." [Appellant's Blue Brief, p.35]. Again, Why'rd tries to claim that the 
Agreement somehow allows them to provide poor quality work, or allows them to 
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provide Cambria with a lemon. Why'rd ignores the fact that reasonable expectations play 
into contract formation. Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah 2000) ("we interpret 
the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable expectations of the parties, looking to the 
agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, nature, and purpose of the contract."). 
When people contract for cable TV, they are contracting for the ability to turn 
their television on and watch TV programs. People do not purchase ESPN in hopes that it 
will work on the big game day. [See R. 1615:16-1614:2]. Rather, they agree to pay a 
monthly rate for stable, reliable service. It is of little consolation to a TV viewer to inform 
them that even though they cannot watch the big game live because their channel is 
suddenly missing, fuzzy, or blank, that a cable repairman will be along within 24 hours. 
The game will be over by the time the repairman arrives, and after needing to call a 
repairman time after time, at some point the TV viewer realizes that the cable company is 
stealing their money from them. 
The Arbitrator correctly concluded after 20+ hours of arbitration testimony, 
several witnesses, and pictures of TV screens, that: "Television service provided by 
Why'rd was frequently poor and included blank channels, fuzzy channels, missing 
channels, changing channel numbers and the like." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact 
1[16]. Assuredly, this poor television service, along with all of the other problems, 
constituted a material breach of the Agreement. In arguing that the poor TV service is an 
immaterial breach of the contract, Why'rd seems to be incredibly out of touch with its 
true clients, those who watch TV. Nobody wants to sit down for a relaxing or entertaining 
time in front of the television only to find that the channel options they are paying good 
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money for are somehow not working that day. Reasonable expectations do play a part in 
interpreting a breach of a service Agreement. Id. Imagine the opposite. Suppose that 
Cambria's residents missed a payment every now and then, or that some checks went 
missing in the mail, or that some checks were too fuzzy to deposit in a bank due to water 
damage that (mysteriously) happened time and time again. Why'rd would be insistent 
that it received every nickel that it contracted to receive each month. However, when 
Why'rd fails to provide exactly what (or even remotely close to what) Cambria expected 
its tenants to receive, it argues that it should be excused from performance because it 
gave them what they bargained for, which, Why'rd argues, is low quality cable TV that 
was never guaranteed to consistently work. 
Basically, Why'rd is trying to create a new definition for cable TV. Cable TV, as 
agreed to in the contract, Why'rd argues, includes incredibly poor TV service. Anything 
better than that, it seems, would be classified by Why'rd as "good cable TV," "better 
cable TV," or "best cable TV." Car salesmen would love to have such definitions so that 
they could sell a "lemon" as a "car," while if one wanted anything better than a "car" that 
is a "lemon," the buyer would specifically have to request to buy a "good car." 
Obviously, reasonable expectations play into the meanings in a contract. Pierce, 994 P.2d 
at 198. Cable TV means the type of TV that others have, the type that works when the TV 
is turned on. Basic cable TV would include limited channels. Premium packages of cable 
TV would include lots more channels with lots of movies and other perks. However, both 
basic cable packages and premium cable packages would be expected to work when the 
TV is turned on. [See Agreement Schedule 1 (the Agreement includes packages with 
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more options, but the Agreement never mentions that the premium packages work more 
consistently than the basic packages offered)]. In other words, basic cable TV is very 
different than broken cable TV. 
Why'rd attempts to disclaim liability for the poor cable TV by pointing to its 
disclaimer provision in section 3.1 of the Agreement. In actuality, this section only 
includes a disclaimer for one item: the content of the programming. [Agreement §3.1 
"[Why'rd] shall have no responsibility or liability for Bulk Programming content"]. In no 
way is this a disclaimer for blank, missing, changing, or frizzy channels. In the same 
section, Why'rd specifically maintains "the sole right to edit, select, schedule and 
determine the [Why'rd] programming services contained in the [Why'rd] programming 
packages." [Agreement §3.1]. At the same time, Why'rd takes on the duty when making 
changes to "not degrade the quality or mix of programming and shall replace deleted 
channels with others of similar quality." [Agreement §3.1]. Finally, Why'rd states that it 
"may add, delete, or modify the Bulk Programming from time to time in its sole 
discretion and will notify Subscriber of the addition or deletion of available Bulk 
Programming." [Agreement §3.1]. 
Clearly, Why'rd's attempt to disclaim all liability for poor cable service is 
seriously misleading. Why'rd has the ability and power to make changes to 
programming, and the only item that Why'rd truly disclaimed being responsible for is the 
content of the programming. In other words, Why'rd contracted to provide Cambria's 
residents with access to the cable channels, and each cable channel sets its own content. It 
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is only the actual programs shown on each channel that Why'rd disclaimed liability for in 
the Agreement. 
Still not giving up, Why'rd turns to lion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 
(Utah 1975) to claim that its poor television service was not of "sufficient substance and 
materiality" to justify terminating the Agreement. The first point, not addressed by 
Why'rd, is that it was not poor television service alone that made Cambria decide to 
terminate the Agreement. The Arbitrator pointed to a non-exhaustive list of at least six 
material breaches. Why'rd's arguing that one of the breaches (the poor TV service) is not 
material does not change the fact that there are five other material breaches listed. 
Second, this Agreement was for cable TV and internet services. Cable TV was a 
significant part of the contract. Why'rd even tried to argue that $36.20/month of the 
$42.40/month was allocated to cable TV. [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact ^15; 
R. 1424:21-25]. Although this position was rejected by the judge for lack of evidence, 
[Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact ^[15], Why'rd's position still shows that it recognized 
the extreme value present in providing cable TV. This is a very different case than that 
presented in Zion's Properties, where a party was not excused from making payments on 
property it purchased just because the seller of the property left some personal items in 
storage on the property. Zion's Properties, 538 P.2d at 1321-22. To have an analogous 
case here, Cambria would be trying to back out of paying for the services because 
Why'rd had left some extra equipment on Cambria's property. That obviously is not the 
case, and Zion's Properties has no application here as cable TV was a central part of the 
Agreement and was not a mere vestige of a much greater agreement. 
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Third, these problems were not something that lasted for a day, a week, or even a 
month. These problems persisted for years. Cambria and the residents did what they 
could to make the arrangement work as they turned on their TV time after time to find 
blank, missing, or fuzzy channels. [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact f 16]. Some 
residents, desperate for functional TV service, resorted to purchasing supplemental TV 
service from third parties, e.g., DirecTV, thus paying two cable bills and only receiving 
one functional service. Id. 
In other words, dependable TV was not something insubstantial under the 
Agreement. It was one of two core purposes for the Agreement. [Arbitral Award, 
Findings of Fact ^[2, 15]. When a core purpose for the Agreement is not fulfilled by a 
party, the other party is then vindicated in its refusal to continue performing. Polyglycoat 
Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979) (stating that a material breach occurs 
when failure of performance "defeats the very object of the contract"); Holbrook v. 
Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App.1994) ("The law is well settled 
that a material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by the non-
breaching party"). 
Fourth, Why'rd remains quiet on the fact that it breached the cable TV portion of 
the Agreement by failing to provide Cambria's residents with the ability to upgrade the 
cable package. [Agreement Schedule 1 |3]. Many residents tried to upgrade, but were 
unable to do so. [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact [^16]. The only option available to 
residents was to purchase a satellite dish and pay for cable from two subscribers. 
[Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact ]fl6]. 
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To sum up, there were plenty of facts for the Arbitrator to find and conclude that 
Why'rd failed to provide acceptable levels of cable TV service to Cambria and its 
residents. Cable TV was a core part of the Agreement, and the failure to provide a 
workable TV service was a material breach of the Agreement. Thus, the Arbitrator's 
findings should be upheld as they are not clearly erroneous or incorrect in anyway. 
C. Cambria is not being unjustly enriched by Why'rd's unwillingness to come 
and claim its own property. 
Because unjust enrichment claims have their basis in equity, appellate courts 
"afford broad discretion to the trial court in its application of unjust enrichment law to the 
facts." Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 12 P.3d 580, 582 (Utah 2000). 
Additionally, Why'rd does recognize that unjust enrichment is not allowed where an 
express contract covers the subject matter of the litigation. Selvig v. Blockbuster 
Enterprises, 266 P.3d 691, 698 (Utah 2011) (following Mann v. American Western Life 
Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978)). Here, it is clear that an express contract covers 
the subject matter of the litigation (breach of the contract), and so no claim for unjust 
enrichment can follow. Id. 
Why'rd attempts to claim that the Agreement is faulty and does not provide for the 
event that the Agreement is terminated early due to Why'rd's breach of the Agreement. 
This is absolutely not true as the Agreement spells out the remedies available upon 
Why'rd's breach. Schedule 2 of the Agreement states that when Why'rd "shall be 
considered to be in default of this agreement [after 30 day notice and opportunity to 
cure], [the] Subscriber [Cambria] may; (a) terminate the agreement and secure services 
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from another provider (b) contract with another provider to correct the deficiency and 
charge these costs back to [Why'rd]." Simply put, Why'rd agreed that if it defaulted 
under the Agreement, Cambria could terminate the Agreement with no associated 
termination costs at its end. Why'rd even agreed that extra costs could be charged back to 
Why'rd. Cambria chose to terminate the Agreement, and did so in the manner required by 
the Agreement. [Arbitral Award, Conclusions 11(4-5]. Accordingly, Why'rd cannot 
recover for unjust enrichment because there is an express and enforceable contract in 
place that dictates the results following a breach of the agreement. Davies v. Olson, 746 
P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App. 1987). 
Why'rd drafted this Agreement. [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact f3]. Why'rd 
knew very well of the costs involved in providing the infrastructure to Cambria, and 
Why'rd elected, on its own accord, to pay for the infrastructure through the monthly fees 
charged to Cambria. In other words, Why'rd knew very well that if it wanted to make its 
money back, it would have to provide the services it contracted to provide. Imagine for a 
moment what the contract would read like if it were any different. Suppose that Why'rd 
wanted to ensure that it did not lose any money in case it breached the Agreement at 
some point in the future. In that case, the contract would require a provision reading 
something similar to the following: "Cambria agrees that if Why'rd defaults on its 
obligations to provide Bulk Programming Services that Cambria will reimburse Why'rd's 
expenses incurred in installing the distribution infrastructure." In simpler terms, the real 
meaning of such language would be: "Cambria agrees that Why'rd should suffer no 
monetary loss whatsoever if Why'rd fails to provide the services it contracted to provide. 
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To that end, if Why'rd defaults, Cambria will pay the hundreds of thousands of dollars 
necessary to make sure that Why'rd does not suffer any loss for its failure to perform." 
Of course, such a provision would be ridiculous. No party would ever agree to 
such terms, yet Why'rd, in seeking unjust enrichment, is asking this Court to rewrite the 
contract to provide just those terms. And, as aptly stated by Why'rd, "a court may not 
make a better contract for the parties than they have made for themselves." TedR. Brown 
and Associates v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 970-71 (Utah App. 1988). While claims 
for unjust enrichment are appropriate at certain times and in certain situations, this is 
clearly not one of them. Neither justice nor equity would ever require Cambria to pay 
Why'rd for its loss. When a party breaches a contract, it is the breaching party's duty to 
pay damages to the non-breaching party to compensate for "natural and probable 
consequence[s] of the breach." Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 
620, 624 (Utah 1979). Unjust enrichment does not change this general rule by requiring 
the non-breaching party to make the breaching party whole for the losses it suffered as a 
result of its choice to breach the Agreement. 
In attempting to appeal to the good graces of this Court, Why'rd makes the plea 
that Cambria "felt inconvenienced by limited bandwidth and less-than-perfect cable 
television. The inconveniences experienced by Cambria residents pale in comparison to 
Why'rd's weighty losses." [Appellant's Blue Brief, p.41]. As has been clear throughout 
this entire proceeding, non-functional internet and cable TV was the norm, not the 
exception. [R. 1610:11-1608:4, 1269:14-1267:8]. In this technologically advanced world, 
people pattern their lives around expectations based on functional internet and cable TV. 
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It is far more than an inconvenience to not have these basic services working, and 
functional internet and cable TV were the whole purpose for ever entering into the 
Agreement. 
The sacrifice by Cambria should not be understated here either where each of 
Cambria's 303 tenants were paying $42.20/month for cable and internet that did not 
work. [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact f 15]. By the termination of the contract Cambria 
was paying over $13,000 in fees to Why'rd ($42.20/tenant * 303 units). [Id, Conclusions 
|4 ] . "Mere inconvenience" or not though, functional internet and cable TV were the heart 
of the Agreement, and Why'rd contracted and agreed to provide these services in 
exchange for monthly payments. When Why'rd failed to provide what it promised, it 
cannot expect Cambria to continue paying for something that it is not receiving. See 
Poly gly coat Corp., 591 P.2d at 451 (stating that a material breach is "certainly a failure of 
performance which 'defeats the very object of the contract' or '[is] of such prime 
importance that the contract would not have been made if default in that particular had 
been contemplated'"). 
Additionally, Why'rd's weighty losses were part of the risk it undertook in 
agreeing to the contract. The communications industry operates with heavy, up-front 
investments in infrastructure that are compensated through contractual arrangements to 
pay for services for a set length of time. The up-front investments are a significant risk, 
and the contract clearly puts the risk of that investment on Why'rd. Individual users do 
not contract to carry that risk. They do not have the money nor the means to provide the 
infrastructure, nor to pay for the infrastructure. 
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In demanding that Cambria pay for the infrastructure, Why'rd is really asking this 
Court to hold that 303 end users pay for Why'rd's failure to perform. When individuals 
sign up for phone service, they are not agreeing to compensate the phone service provider 
for losses it experiences at its end. They are simply agreeing to pay their monthly bill. It 
is the same for internet and cable services. The users sign an agreement to pay the 
monthly rate, and it is up to the service provider to manage their business in such a way 
that they maintain cash flow and fulfill their contractual obligations. 
If this Court were to hold that Cambria must compensate Why'rd for its losses, 
this Court would significantly be refiguring the entire communications industry as 
distinct users would then be required to bear the risk of a service provider failing to 
perform its obligations. All that users ask for is the service that they contract for, and they 
are willing to pay service providers significant amounts of money each month to 
compensate the service provider for the service and for bearing the risks associated with 
the installation of infrastructure. Cambria should not be required to be a guarantor for 
Why'rd, especially because the contract in no way even infers such an obligation. The 
Arbitrator was correct in ruling that Cambria is not being unjustly enriched. 
"Cambria is not using any significant portion of the infrastructure installed and 
owned by Why'rd." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact ffl[27-28]. Why'rd still claims that 
the infrastructure somehow has value though. Why'rd raises "quasi-contractual dut[ies] 
to pay for the value of the benefit conferred..." Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 
425 (Utah App. 1994), and then points to an example of a concrete contractor who 
abandoned his job but was still able to recover for the portion of the work he had 
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completed. Lowe v. Rosenlof, 364 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1961). Why'rd significantly 
misses the point of these two cases though. The Utah Supreme Court stated that the 
contractor was "entitled to payment on a quantum meruit basis for the work which he did 
perform." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the "value of the benefit conferred" is in reference 
to the period of time where services were actually provided, or performed. See Id. Here, 
Cambria met its monthly payment obligations for each month that it took the extremely 
poor service from Why'rd. Why'rd received payments each month for the "benefit 
conferred" upon Cambria. Thus, as Cambria paid Why'rd each month for the litilited 
"value of the benefits" it received, it has satisfied all of its duties under the contract, in 
law, and in equity. 
Why'rd attempts to argue that the infrastructure, even though not used by 
Cambria, confers value in addition to the limited services it provided. This is a 
philosophical argument that has no basis in fact. If a satellite TV provider were to go out 
of business and leave its satellite dish on top of a customer's house, it could not sue the 
customer for unjust enrichment, even if it cost the company more in gas to drive to the 
house to retrieve the dish than the dish was worth. The customer did not steal the dish or 
make use of it in anyway. The customer in no way is enriched by a leftover satellite dish 
sitting on its roof. If Why'rd wants Cambria to pay for the wires sitting under the ground, 
Why'rd must show how those wires provide a real, measurable benefit to Cambria. 
American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 
(Utah 1996) ("the remedy [of unjust enrichment] is one of restitution designed to restore 
to a plaintiff a benefit unjustly enjoyed by a defendant") (emphasis added). Cambria has 
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not benefitted in anyway from Why'rd's failure to remove its infrastructure and cannot be 
required to pay for useless equipment (or garbage, from Cambria's perspective) buried 
under the ground that it will never, in the legal sense, enjoy in anyway. Id. Why'rd's 
claim for $400,064 in unjust enrichment damages is highly dubious because the arbitrator 
neither found the Why'rd actually invested $834,570.88 in infrastructure or that Cambria 
has been unjustly enriched.2 Moreover, Why'rd has failed to account for the fact it has 
removed the vast majority of its equipment already and the remnants of the system have 
no independent value. [Arbitral Award f 6, See also, Exhibit 1]. 
Finally, Why'rd claims that it is too cost prohibitive to remove its infrastructure 
and that "[t]o retrieve the infrastructure, Why'rd would have to tear up sidewalks, streets, 
curbs, and gutters." [Appellant's Blue Brief, p.42]. This is an incomplete picture of the 
infrastructure involved. Only the wires are underground. The wires are in a conduit pipe, 
and so most, if not all, of the wires can be disconnected at both ends and then pulled out 
of the conduit (that is, if they have not already been removed by Why'rd, see Exhibit #1). 
Why'rd has of the date of this brief been given every opportunity to recover any part of 
the wiring, or infrastructure they felt necessary. The only infrastructure that would be left 
underground is the hollow conduit pipes, and ownership of the pipes was disputed and 
never resolved at trial because Why'rd did not call its witness who testified in a 
deposition that Why'rd did not pay for the pipes. [R. 1420:10-1419:13]. The rest of the 
2
 Expert witness, Spencer Wangsgard testified of Why'rd's installation costs, "I don't 
know where that number [Why'rd's claimed installation costs] is coming from. In my 
head, I can't imagine a scenario where it would cost that much to go into an open trench, 
put some pipes together, and have somebody else come and bury them. It just doesn't—I 
can't fathom hos it would come to that much money." [R-l 164; 8-24]. 
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system involves equipment that is placed indoors or in outdoor boxes that sit by the curb. 
And, Michael Burnett, Why'rd's principal owner, testified that the HOA and/or the 
tenants own the wires inside each building. [R. 1456:11-20]. Cambria repeatedly offered 
to let Why'rd come and remove its remaining property and did not block Why'rd's access 
to do so in anyway. See Exhibit #1. 
The Arbitrator was correct in concluding that Cambria has not been unjustly 
enriched. Cambria has no use for the infrastructure and is not being enriched in anyway 
by its existence. This Court should not rewrite the contract to redistribute the risks taken 
on by Why'rd, and should deny Why'rd's attempts to recover for losses it sustained as a 
result of its failure to perform. 
D. In its last section, Why'rd openly tries to trick this Court. 
All throughout Why'rd's arguments, it has been readily apparent that this case 
should never have been appealed. The Arbitrator saw through all of Why'rd's attempts to 
manipulate the contract and the facts to appear as if Cambria purposely signed up for 
internet and cable TV that did not work or that Cambria somehow managed to inhibit 
Why'rd from performing its contractual duties. The Arbitrator saw through Why'rd's 
attempt to leave out the word "consecutive," Why'rd's swapping of the word "server" 
with "use" to focus on "high volume use" instead of "high volume servers," Why'rd's 
attempts to transfer its contractual duties to Cambria, and Why'rd's attempt to rewrite the 
contract through seeking unjust enrichment. When Why'rd lost in its attempts with the 
Arbitrator, it repackaged the claims and brought them to this Court. 
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{ 
The last point that Why'rd repackages and makes to this Court is rather appalling 
because Why'rd definitely knows much more than it professes to know. In section VI of ( 
its brief, Why'rd states that: 
[t]he Arbitrator found that Why'rd breached the Agreement by failing 'to 
supply a system capacity within the project of 10 mbps to each tenant.' { 
During the Arbitration, however, Cambria's attorney acknowledged that the 
parties stipulated 'that ten megabits was coming into the headend unit'... 
This finding of breach plainly contradicts the stipulation of the parties and 
was clearly erroneous. [Appellant's Blue Brief, pp. 43-44]. 
i 
What Why'rd failed to tell this Court is that this precise issue was argued by Why'rd at a 
Motion In Limine on December 7th, 2010. There, Why'rd argued that it only had the duty 
to provide certain speeds to the headend unit, as distinct from the tenants of Cambria (of * 
which there are 303). [Arbitral Award Exhibit A]. Why'rd ran all services into Cambria 
through the headend unit (as there is only one headend unit located in the club house), 
and then dispersed the services to the 303 individual units inside Cambria HO A. [See 
Arbitral Award Exhibit A]. 
The Arbitrator held that the contract required certain capacities to be supplied to 
each tenant, or individual unit. The parties' stipulation referenced by Why'rd was that the 
contracted for capacity existed at the headend unit before that capacity was broken up and < 
distributed to each tenant. The Arbitrator clearly found that the capacity, once broken up 
and distributed to each tenant, was woefully under the capacity specified for each tenant 
( 
in the contract. 
{ 
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In light of this knowledge, it is wise to read through once more what Why'rd 
argued in its brief. The entire section VI is quoted below with emphasis and additional 
points added in brackets [] to show how appalling Why'rd's arguments really are. 
The Arbitrator found that Why'rd breached the Agreement by failing 
to "supply a system capacity within the project of 10 mbps to each tenant." 
[Yes, the finding was about the supply to the tenants and not to the headend 
unit.] During the Arbitration, however, Cambria's attorney acknowledged 
that the parties stipulated "that ten megabits was coming into the headend 
unit." [R. 961:25-960:10]. Cambria's attorney further stated as follows: 
• "This whole issue has been exhausted when we had the hearing on 
December 7 [The Motion In Limine]. In fact, it was stipulated to that 
10 megs in fact was being received by the headend unit." [R. 
868:19-22]. 
• "I did not disagree that 10 megs was coming to the headend unit." 
[R. 664:11-12]. 
• "Counsel, if you're trying to establish the 10 megs to the headend 
unit, it has been stipulated. Go on." [R. 1046:9-11]. 
This finding of breach [about the supply to each tenant] plainly 
contradicts the stipulation of the parties [about the supply to the headend 
unit] and was clearly erroneous [even though the stipulation and the finding 
are on two very different points]. Certainly, the headend unit could not 
receive 10 mbps unless it had the capacity to do so. Cambria specifically 
acknowledged, at least four times, that Why'rd supplied 10 mbps to 
Cambria [the headend unit]. 
Because of the stipulation in place between the parties, neither party 
presented any substantial evidence on this point at the Arbitration. [That is 
true, because all of the evidence surrounding this issue was presented at the 
Motion In Limine.] Why'rd is unaware of any evidence to support this 
finding. [Even though Why'rd was present at the Motion In Limine and 
argued extensively there]. The basis for the finding of breach on this point 
is, therefore, difficult to determine. [Even though the Arbitral Award on p.2 
says "A 'Decision' on the Motion In Limine was rendered on December 8, 
2010, and is incorporated herein by this reference. See, Exhibit A."]. 
Whether the Court analyzes this under a clearly erroneous standard (for the 
Arbitrator's erroneous factual findings), or a correctness standard (for the 
Arbitrator's misinterpretation of the stipulation), it should reverse the 
finding of breach as to this issue. 
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( 
In light of Why'rd's uncertainty as to the basis of the Arbitrator's 
finding of breach [even though it knows very well what the entire Motion < 
In Limine was about], in the very unlikely event that Cambria argues that 
the Arbitrator was not in error on this point, Why'rd begs some license to 
more fully address this breach in its reply brief. 
Cambria has tried to be civil in this matter but this section of Why'rd's brief is < 
demonstrably false. Why'rd would have this Court reverse the Arbitrator's findings on 
capacity supplied to 303 individual units when the parties stipulated about capacity 
received at one headend unit and never once stipulated that the 303 units received 
lOmbps of throughput speed. Somehow Why'rd ignores another, and more relevant, 
stipulation made by both parties, that "No end user [or tenant] is currently receiving, or 
has access to, 3 mbps at all times." [Arbitral Award, Findings of Fact f9]. Why'rd 
understands the difference very well between a tenant (or end user) and a headend unit, 
yet Why'rd feigns ignorance of these facts and conflates these two distinct facts before 
this Court. Why'rd knows very well that the Arbitrator's basis for finding breach with 
respect to the lOmbps capacity was based on the fact that no tenant had lOmbps. The 
Arbitrator was not making a finding with respect to headend units. It was making 
findings with respect to tenants. 
The Arbitrator saw through all of Why'rd's tricks, and this Court should as well. 
There is no basis to overturn the findings below. Towards the end of the arbitration, 
Why'rd completely lost credibility as a main witness made extensive changes to his 
testimony concerning Why'rd's lost profits. [R. 1419-1331 (Justin Burnett testified to 
profit/damage figures of $2.8 million one day, $1.15 million the day before, and profits of 
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only $10,000 at a preliminary injunction hearing on irreparable harm)]. At the end of 
Why'rd's appellate brief it similarly throws its credibility out the window by arguing 
something that is patently false. The Arbitrator, acting as fact finder, appropriately judged 
the veracity of the witnesses and the stretched nature of the claims and found for 
Cambria. There was no error in doing so, and this Court should uphold the findings 
below and not fall prey to Why'rd's attempt at claiming Cambria contracted for poor 
services and that Cambria inhibited Why'rd from performing its obligations under the 
contract. Why'rd's services were a true lemon and so dysfunctional that it is clear 
Why'rd materially breached the Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Cambria requests the Court uphold the Arbitral Award entered below, enter 
judgment in favor of Appellee, and award other such relief as is just and appropriate, 
including attorney fees in this matter. 
Dated and signed this 16th day of April, 2012. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
These emails are not part of the record as they occurred after arbitration. 
*n 
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Wednesday, Apri! 11,2012 11:11:18 AM MT 
Subject: RE: Congratulations 
Date: Friday, August 19, 201110:43:44 AM MT 
From: Justin Heideman 
To: Cole S. Cannon, Esq. 
Cole: 
Sorry iff caused any confusion, I was simply forwarding the data regarding the time. Not asking 
for your advice. Frankly the response is simple, your guys want my guys out, and my guys don't 
want to work with your guys any longer so pull the stuff Mike just indicated that he would be at 
the property for the removal at 10:00 a.m. 
Justin, 
From,0 Cole S. Cannon, Esq. [mailto:cole@cannonlife.com] 
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 7:55 AM 
To,0 Justin Heideman 
Subject? Re; Congratulations 
I'll see if next Wednesday works. I suppose at least a board member will be on site to oversee the matter. As for 
the appeal; I won't think to advise your client, however whatever happens on appeal, Why'rd will not be 




From: Justin Heideman <iheideman(a>hmho-law.com> 
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2011 20:05:25 -0700 (PDT) 
To: Cole Cannon <cole(5>cannonlife.com> 
Subject: Fwd: Congratulations 
See below. 
Sent from my HTC on the Now Network from Sprint! 
Forwarded message 
From: "Mike Burnett" <mike<S>why-rdxom> 
Date: Thu, Aug 18, 2011 7:37 pm 
Subject: Congratulations 
To: "Justin Heideman" <iheideman@hmho-iaw.com> 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Wednesday AprSS 11F 2012 11:22:18 A M M T | 
Subject: RE: Call 
Date: Wednesday, August 24, 201112:57:07 PM M l 
From: brian@parker-brown.com 
To: 'Cole S. Cannon, Esq.' 
Nope we are good. 
Brian Evans Brown 
Principal Broker, Realtor, COPE 






From: Cole S. Cannon, Esq. [mailto:cole@cannonlife.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2011 12:00 PM 
To: brian@parker-brown.com 
Subject: Re: Call 
Any problems in removal? 
Thanks, 
C 
Cole S. Cannon Esq., LLM-Tax, MPP, Principal 
Cannon Law Group, PLLC 
455 E. 400 S. #400 





vx~mj V J 
This message is intended only for the use of the Addressee and may contain information that is PRIVILEGED 
and CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the intended recipient,- you are hereby notified that any dissemination of 
this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please erase ail 
copies of the message and its attachments and notify me immediately. 
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DEBT COLLECTION NOTICE: This firm collects debts. This communication may be an attempt to collect a debt. 
Any information obtained as a result of this communication or subsequent communications may be used to 
collect the debt. 
From: <brian(® parker-brown.com> 
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 201115:15:58 -0600 
To: Cole Cannon <cole(a)cannonlifexom> 
Subject: RE: Call 
Will do thanks, 
Brian Evans Brown 
Principal Broker, Realtor, CDPE 





From: Cole S. Cannon, Esq. rmailto:cole@cannonlifexom] 
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 3:12 PM 
To: brian@parker-brown.com 
Subject.9 Re: Call 
Hey Brian, 
Just to put it in writing. I'm told Michael Burnett is coordinating to remove Why'rd's property on Wedensday at 
10 am. Please have someone onsite monitoring the removal. If Why'rd is damaging Cambria's property in any 
way call my cell (714-362-1087) or my associate Maren Barker at 301.508.2900. If anything gets heated (which I 
doubt) call the police and have Why'rd escorted from the property. 
Best, 
Cole 
Cole S. Cannon Esq., LLM-Tax, MPP, Principal 
Cannon Law Group, PLLC 
455 E. 400 S. #400 





Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
